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ABSTRACT 
Pairwise key distribution among the sensor nodes is an essential 
problem for providing security in Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs). The common approach for this problem is random key 
predistribution, which suffers from resiliency issues in case of 
node captures by adversaries. In the literature, the resiliency 
problem is addressed by zone-based deployment models that use 
prior deployment knowledge. Another remedy in the literature, 
which is for multiphase WSNs, aims to provide self-healing 
property via periodic deployments of sensor nodes with fresh keys 
over the sensor field. However, to the best of our knowledge, these 
two approaches have never been combined before in the literature. 
In this paper, we propose a zone-based key predistribution 
approach for multiphase WSNs. Our approach combines the best 
parts of these approaches and provides self-healing property with 
up to 6-fold more resiliency as compared to an existing scheme. 
Moreover, our scheme ensures almost 100% secure connectivity, 
which means a sensor node shares at least one key with almost all 
of its neighbors. 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General – 
Security and protection (e.g., firewalls).  
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
Multiphase Sensor Networks; Sensor Network Security; Node 
Capture Attacks; Key Distribution; Resiliency 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [1] consist of small, battery-
operated, limited memory and limited computational power 
devices called sensor nodes. The main task of a WSN is to sense 
some events and carry these readings to a base station, called the 
sink. The application areas of WSNs vary from military 
applications to agriculture, habitat monitoring and healthcare. In 
several applications, security of the data transferred within the 
WSN is of utmost importance.  When WSN deployed in hostile 
areas, there is a possibility that the nodes can be captured by 
adversaries. Each captured node gives away information about the 
network. Thus, the security mechanisms must be designed by 
considering such attack scenarios.  
A key requirement of a security design for a WSN is pairwise key 
distribution among the neighboring sensor nodes. In the literature, 
the most cited approach is Eschenauer and Gligor’s (EG) Random 
Key Predistribution approach [4]. In this approach, a set of random 
keys selected from a global key pool is predistributed into sensor 
nodes’ key rings in a redundant way. After the deployment, 
neighboring nodes share at least one common key with a certain 
probability. This probability is called secure connectivity. More 
keys predistributed into sensor nodes increase the chance of having 
a common key between neighboring nodes (i.e. increase secure 
connectivity). However, in case of a capture of a node, more keys 
are revealed to the adversary. Therefore, there is tradeoff between 
secure connectivity and resiliency against node captures.  
In order to increase the resiliency of EG scheme without reducing 
secure connectivity, Du et al. proposed Zone-based Random Key 
Predistribution (Zo-RKP) using deployment knowledge in key 
predistribution [2]. In this method, sensor field is divided into 
zones and nodes that are to be deployed over these zones are 
grouped in batches. Each zone has its own key pool and the key 
pools of neighboring zones share keys. Before the deployment, the 
nodes of each group are stored random keys that are selected from 
the corresponding zone’s key pool. Since the nodes of a particular 
zone are likely to be neighbors after the deployment, same level of 
secure connectivity is achieved by using less number of keys per 
node as compared to EG scheme.  Since the nodes need to store 
less number of keys in their key rings, less information is revealed 
to an attacker in case of node captures. Therefore, the resiliency 
increases. 
Another important work in the literature that aims increase the 
network resiliency without reducing secure connectivity is 
proposed by Castelluccia and Spognardi [3] for multiphase sensor 
networks. In multiphase sensor networks, the sensor nodes are 
periodically redeployed as their batteries are depleted. In the 
scheme proposed in [3], called robust key pre-distribution (RoK), 
the keys are refreshed in each redeployment so that the keys that 
are compromised by the adversary become useless in time. In this 
way, the network heals itself.   
In this paper, we propose Zo-RoK, Zone-based Robust Key 
Distribution. In Zo-RoK, we combine RoK [3] and Zo-RKP [2] 
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schemes in order to boost up the resiliency performance of WSNs 
while keeping the network securely connected using less number 
of keys per node. We adapt the zone-based random key 
predistribution model of Zo-RKP scheme into the multiphase 
deployment model of RoK scheme. In this way, 100% secure 
connectivity is achieved with small amount of keys per node. This, 
in turn, reduces the number of secure link keys to be compromised 
by the adversary. Moreover, due to key refresh at each 
redeployment, the usefulness of the compromised keys becomes 
limited in time. Our performance analyses show that our Zo-RoK 
scheme is as much as 6 times more resilient to node capture attacks 
as compared to RoK with the same level of secure connectivity. 
Moreover, Zo-RoK saves 70% of key memory space as compared 
to RoK scheme.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We explain the 
proposed model in Section 2. Performance evaluation is given in 
Section 3. In section 4, related work is presented and finally 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. THE PROPOSED MODEL 
In this section, we explain the proposed Zo-RoK (Zone-based 
Robust Key Distribution) scheme. First, we give some background 
information about Du et al.’s zone-based deployment model [2] 
and the RoK scheme [3] on which our proposed scheme is built on. 
After that, we explain the random key predistribution and the 
pairwise key generation phases of our Zo-RoK scheme. 
2.1 Background Information 
In our Zo-RoK scheme, the main purpose is increased resiliency 
with while keeping (i) the self-healing property of RoK, and (ii) 
high secure connectivity rates as in RoK again. Resiliency is the 
endurance of the system to node capture attacks. Secure 
connectivity is the probability of two neighboring nodes to share a 
common key. In random key predistribution schemes, such as [2], 
[3] and [4], in order to reach high secure connectivity, nodes must 
be equipped with more keys prior to deployment. This, on the 
other hand, is a security risk. If an adversary attacks to the network 
and captures some nodes, it will learn keys that might also be used 
another part of the network. Thus, not only the captured nodes’ 
secure links, but also some innocent secure links between 
uncaptured nodes become compromised. This means, resiliency is 
undesirably declined. In order to improve resiliency, less keys 
should be stored into the nodes prior to deployment, but this should 
be done without sacrificing from secure connectivity. The zone-
based deployment model of Du et al.’s Zo-RKP scheme [2] uses 
deployment knowledge during key predistribution. In this way, 
high secure connectivity values can be reached with less number of 
keys per node. This, in turn, causes increased resiliency. 
In RoK model [3], sensor nodes are redeployed periodically. The 
time period in which new nodes are deployed is called generation. 
In each generation, some nodes are redeployed. Some nodes die 
due to battery depletion in each generation as well. A refreshed key 
ring is stored for each redeployed node. The key rings are 
generation-specific so that the attacker cannot make use of a 
captured key after a certain amount of generations. Similarly, the 
attacker can make use of the keys of a captured node for the 
messages sent by the nodes that belong to a couple of previous 
generations only. To provide this facility, each node keeps 
backward and forward key rings. The keys in these key rings are 
randomly selected from forward and backward key pools, 
respectively. In each generation, the keys in forward key pool are 
hashed.  For the backward key pool, a hash chain is generated for 
each key. In each generation, each key is replaced with the next 
value in the corresponding hash chain. Nodes that have common 
key indices can calculate each other’s generation versions with 
some hash calculations. In this way, they establish pairwise key. 
Similarly, the attacker can calculate some link keys when it 
captures a node. However, these link keys are limited with the 
lifetimes of the sensor nodes. When a node dies and is replaced 
with a redeployed one, the adversary cannot make use of the keys 
of the dead node to compromise the links of the newly deployed 
one. Therefore, the effect of a node capture lasts certain amount of 
time. This property is called self-healing property. The amount of 
time that the attacker makes use of a captured key ring is related to 
the average lifetime of a node. In RoK model, the average lifetime 
is taken as 5 generations. We also use the same value in Zo-RoK. 
The readers may refer to [3] for more detailed discussion on RoK. 
2.2 Our Contribution 
In our Zo-RoK scheme, we adapt the zone-based deployment 
model of Zo-RKP scheme [2] into the RoK model [3] in order to 
have increased resiliency with self healing property. We divide the 
sensor field into contingent zones and employ forward and 
backward key pools for each zone. The nodes of particular zones 
obtain their key rings from their zone key pools. For each 
generation, zone key pools are updated (via hash and hash chains) 
as in RoK. The main novelty in our scheme lies in the adaptation 
of the Du et al.’s zone based deployment model into RoK. This is 
explained in the next section. As will be discussed in Section 3, 
with the proposed adaptation, Zo-RoK tremendously improves the 
resiliency of the network against node capture attacks as compared 
to RoK without any decrease in the secure connectivity.  
Table 1. Notations used in the paper 
FKP Global forward key pool 
BKP Global backward key pool 
ܨܭ ௭ܲ
௝  Forward key pool for region z at generation j 
݂݇ఎ,క,௜
௝  ith key of the forward sub key pool shared between zones 
(regions)  ߦ and ߟ at generation j     
݂݇௭,଴,௜
௝  ith key of non-shared forward sub key pool of zone (region)  
ݖ  at generation  j   
ܤܭ ௭ܲ
௝ Backward key pool for region z at generation j 
ܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௝  ith key of the backward sub key pool shared between zones 
(regions)  ߦ and ߟ at generation j     
ܾ݇௭,଴,௜
௝  ith key of non-shared backward sub key pool of zone 
(region)  ݖ  at generation j   
ܪሺ·ሻ Irreversible Hash function 
ଵ݂ሺ·,·,·ሻ Three-factor ordering function 
ଶ݂ሺ·ሻ Pseudorandom number sequence generator function 
ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜ i
th element of the pseudorandom number sequence generated 
for node A of zone z at generation j 
ߟ ุ ߦ Zone ߟ and zone ߦ are horizontally neighboring zones  
ߟ ՟ ߦ Zone ߟ and zone ߦ are vertically neighboring zones 
ߟ ա ߦ Zone ߟ and zone ߦ are diagonally neighboring zones 
݉ Last generation 
ܩܹ Generation window 
ܲ Global key pool size (half is for forward, half is for 
backward key pools) 
ܵ Regional key pool size (half is for forward, half is for 
backward key pools) 
݇ Key ring size (half is for forward, half is for backward key 
rings) 
݀ Diagonal neighbor key sharing constant 
݊ Vertical / horizontal neighbor key sharing constant  
ܼ Number of zones, ܼ ൌ ݐ ൈ ݐ 
2.3 Key Predistribution in Zo-RoK 
In our Zo-RoK scheme, the sensor field is divided into a two 
dimensional grid of zones/regions1 as in [2]. Each zone has its own 
forward and backward key pools. The forward and backward key 
pools of each zone are selected from global forward and backward 
key pools. Moreover, the neighboring zones’ forward and 
backward key pools share keys.  
The notations used in the explanation of our model are given in 
Table 1.  
2.3.1 Generation of Forward and Backward Regional 
Key Pools 
As in [2], our scheme uses different sharing factors for the key 
pools of horizontal/vertical and diagonal neighboring zones. As 
shown in Figure 1, vertical and horizontal neighbor zones share 
݊ · ܵ keys, diagonal neighbor zones share ݀ · ܵ  keys, where 
4ሺ݊ ൅ ݀ሻ ൌ 1. This is the original method of Du et al. [2]; we 
adopt this to multiphase networks in Zo-RoK as will be detailed 
below. 
 
Figure 1.  Key sharing among neighboring zones  
The sizes of the global forward and backward key pools are ܲ/2 
each. Similarly, for each region, backward pool size and forward 
key pool size is ܵ/2.  
Let us now generalize key pool sharing and regional key pool 
generation mechanisms for a square sensor field with  ݐ ൈ ݐ zones. 
In such a field, for each row, ݐ െ 1 horizontal forward sub key 
pools are shared between neighboring zones. Similarly, for each 
column,  ݐ െ 1 vertical forward sub key pools are shared between 
neighboring zones. In this way, the total number of horizontally 
and vertically shared forward sub key pools becomes 2 · ݐሺݐ െ 1ሻ, 
each has distinct ݊ · ܵ/2 forward keys drawn from the global 
forward key pool. The same analysis directly applies for backward 
sub key pools; the total number of horizontally and vertically 
shared backward sub key pools is 2 · ݐሺݐ െ 1ሻ, each has distinct 
݊ · ܵ/2 backward keys drawn from the global backward key pool.  
There are also distinct shared diagonal forward and backward sub 
key pools in this setting. The total number of diagonally shared 
forward sub key pools is 2 · ሺݐ െ 1ሻଶ, each has ݀ · ܵ/2 distinct 
forward keys drawn from global forward key pool. Similarly, the 
total number of diagonally shared backward sub key pools is 
2 · ሺݐ െ 1ሻଶ, each has ݀ · ܵ/2 distinct backward keys drawn from 
global backward key pool. 
                                                     
1 From this point on, zone and region will be used interchangeably. 
Each shared sub key pool has distinct keys drawn from the 
corresponding global key pool (backward or forward). When a key 
is assigned to a shared key pool, it is deleted from the global one 
so that it is not reused in another shared pool.  
Each zone establishes its key pool using the abovementioned 
horizontally, vertically and diagonally shared sub key pools. For 
each horizontally neighboring zone pair, the keys in a horizontally 
shared forward sub key pool are assigned to the forward key pools 
of these neighboring zones. A shared key pool used for a zone pair 
is not used again for other neighboring pairs. The same procedure 
is applied for the backward keys. Similarly, the vertical and 
diagonal neighbor pairs undergo the same process using vertically 
and diagonally shared sub key pools. In this way, all shared sub 
key pools are used. Identities of the individual keys are assigned 
during the assignment of shared sub key pools to zone key pools. 
More formally, a forward key or a backward key is identified using 
three tuples as ݂݇௫,௬,௜ and ܾ݇௫,௬,௜, where x and y are the indices of 
two neighboring zones. The index i is the order of the key in the 
shared forward or backward sub key pool, where 
݅ ൌ 1, 2,… , ݊ · ܵ/2  for horizontal and vertical neighbors,  
݅ ൌ 1, 2,… , ݀ · ܵ/2  for diagonal neighbors.   
The abovementioned process of zone key pool establishment 
assigns ܵ/2 keys for non-boundary zones; thus, the key pool 
establishment for these zones is completed. However, this process 
puts less than ܵ/2 keys in the key pools of the boundary zones 
since they do not have enough neighbors to share keys. In order to 
equalize the key pool sizes for all zones, boundary zones should 
fill up the remaining keys from the backward and forward global 
key pools. The total number of missing forward keys for each of 
the four corner zones is ሺ1 െ 2݊ െ ݀ሻ · ܵ 2⁄ . The total number of 
missing backward keys is also the same. Other than these four 
corner zones, there are 4 · ሺݐ െ 1ሻ side zones. The number of 
missing keys of the forward key pool for each of these side zones 
is ሺ1 െ 3݊ െ 2݀ሻ · ܵ 2⁄ . The number of missing backward keys is 
also the same. The identities of those non-shared keys are assigned 
after their assignments to the regional key pools. For the sake of 
standardization, again a 3-tuple identification is used, however 
second zone index is set to 0, meaning that this key is not shared 
between zones. More formally, such non-shared forward and 
backward keys are denoted as ݂݇௫,଴,௜ and ܾ݇௫,଴,௜, where x is the 
index of the owning zone and i is the order of drawing from the 
corresponding global key pool. The range of i depends on whether 
x is a corner or side zone; ݅ ൌ 1, 2,… , ሺ1 െ 2݊ െ ݀ሻ · ܵ 2⁄  for 
corner zones, and  ݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ሺ1 െ 3݊ െ 2݀ሻ · ܵ 2⁄   for side 
zones.  
As can be seen from the above analysis, the backward and forward 
global key pools must be spent for the shared sub key pools and for 
the missing keys of the boundary zones. Moreover, there are same 
amount of keys for both backward and forward keys in each 
category. Thus, the size of regional backward/forward key pools, 
ܵ
2ൗ  , is calculated as follows. 
ܵ
2ൗ ൌ
ܲ
2ൗ
2݊ݐሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ 2݀ሺݐ െ 1ሻଶ ൅  4ሺ1 െ 2݊ െ ݀ሻ ൅ 4ሺݐ െ 1ሻሺ1 െ 3݊ െ 2݀ሻ
 
            [1] 
As in RoK [3] scheme, we use the generation concept in Zo-RoK. 
Therefore, the regional backward and forward key pools are to be 
created for each generation. For forward key pools, initial 
generation is 0. For generation-0 forward key pool of each zone, 
ܵ/2 keys are selected from the global forward key pool as 
described in this subsection. For region z, initial forward key pool 
is formally shown as follows. 
ܨܭ ௭ܲ଴
ൌ ൜݂݇ఎ,క,௜
଴ ฬ
ሺ ߟ ൌ ݖ  ש  ߦ ൌ ݖሻ ר ሺߟ ุ ߦ  ש  ߟ ՟ ߦሻ,
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݊ · ܵ/2,   ߟ ൌ 1,2,… , ܼ,   ߦ ൌ 1,2, … , ܼൠ ራ   
 ൜݂݇ఎ,క,௜
଴ ฬ
ሺ ߟ ൌ ݖ  ש  ߦ ൌ ݖሻ ר ሺߟ ա ߦሻ,
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݀ · ܵ/2,   ߟ ൌ 1,2, … , ܼ,   ߦ ൌ 1,2,… , ܼൠ  ራ   
 ቐ݂݇௭,଴,௜
଴ ቮ
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ሺ1 െ 2݊ െ ݀ሻ · ܵ 2⁄ , if z  is corner zone
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ሺ1 െ 3݊ െ 2݀ሻ · ܵ 2,⁄  if z  is a side zone
׎, if z  is a non‐boundary zone
ቑ, 
where  ݖ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܼ                          [2] 
In order to update the keys for the other generations, we use the 
same approach employed in RoK. At each generation, the keys are 
updated by the help of an irreversible hash function. Each key of 
the forward key pool is hashed to generate the key pool of the next 
generation. More formally, the forward key pool of zone z in 
generation j is shown as follows.   
ܨܭ ௭ܲ
௝ ൌ ቄ݂݇ఎ,క,௜
௝  ቚ ݂݇ఎ,క,௜
௝ ൌ ܪ ቀ݂݇ఎ,క,௜
௝ିଵቁ , ׊  ݂݇ఎ,క,௜
௝ିଵ  א  ܨܭ ௭ܲ
௝ିଵቅ, 
where   ݖ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܼ   and   ݆ ൌ 1, 2, … ,݉       [3] 
Backward key pools for different generations are prepared similar 
to forward key pools with one difference such that the preparations 
should start with the last generation, m. The reason is that one-way 
hash chains [11] are used for each of the backward keys and they 
have to be utilized from the end. Thus, the first regional backward 
key pools are the generation-m pools, which are formally shown as 
follows.  
ܤܭ ௭ܲ௠
ൌ ൜ܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௠ ฬ
ሺ ߟ ൌ ݖ  ש  ߦ ൌ ݖሻ ר ሺߟ ุ ߦ  ש  ߟ ՟ ߦሻ,
݅ ൌ 1, 2,… , ݊ · ܵ/2,   ߟ ൌ 1,2, … , ܼ,   ߦ ൌ 1,2, … , ܼൠ ራ   
൜ܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௠ ฬ
ሺ ߟ ൌ ݖ  ש  ߦ ൌ ݖሻ ר ሺߟ ա ߦሻ,
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݀ · ܵ/2,   ߟ ൌ 1,2, … , ܼ,   ߦ ൌ 1,2, … , ܼ
ൠ  ራ   
ቐܾ݇௭,଴,௜
௠ ቮ
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ሺ1 െ 2݊ െ ݀ሻ · ܵ 2⁄ , if z  is corner zone
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ሺ1 െ 3݊ െ 2݀ሻ · ܵ 2,⁄  if z  is a side zone
׎, if z  is a non‐boundary zone
ቑ, 
where  ݖ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܼ          [4] 
Each key of these key pools is the first element (seed) of a one-
way hash chain. The keys of generation ݉ െ 1 are the second 
elements of the chains, and so on. More formally, the backward 
key pool of zone z in generation j is represented as follows.  
ܤܭ ௭ܲ
௝ ൌ ቄܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௝  ቚ ܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௝ ൌ ܪ ቀܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௝ାଵቁ , ׊  ܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௝ାଵ  א  ܤܭ ௭ܲ
௝ାଵቅ, 
where   ݖ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܼ   and   ݆ ൌ  ݉ െ 1,݉ െ 2,… , 0       [5] 
Here one should notice that the subscript triplets of a forward key 
pool are exactly the same as the subscript triplets of the 
corresponding backward key pool. This is particularly important 
for key ring generations and session key establishment that will be 
discussed in subsequent sections.  
2.3.2   Generation of Key Rings 
In this section, we describe the process of key assignments to the 
nodes. Each node in Zo-RoK has forward and backward key rings, 
as in RoK. However, different from RoK, each node picks its keys 
from regional key pools. The selection process is random.  
In order to facilitate the description of the key ring assignment 
process, we assume that the keys of both forward and backward 
key pools of each zone are ordered by their subscript triplets and 
each key is assigned an implicit sequence number in the range of 
[1, 2, … , ܵ/2]. The ordering is done in a way that the implicit 
sequence number of a particular forward key ݂݇ఎ,క,௜
௝  is the same as 
its backward counterpart ܾ݇ఎ,క,௜
௝ . The ordering function ଵ݂ሺߟ, ߦ, ݅ሻ 
gets the subscript triplet as parameter and returns the implicit 
sequence number (in the range of 1, 2,… , ܵ/2) of that key in the 
corresponding forward and backward key pools.  
There are total of ݇ keys in a key ring. Half of it is for forward, the 
other half is for backward keys. We employ a pseudorandom 
number generator function ଶ݂ሺ. ሻ that returns a nonrepeating 
pseudorandom sequence of ݇/2 numbers, ݎ௜, ݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݇/2 and 
0 ൏ ݎ௜ ൑ ܵ/2 . These values are then used to determine the random 
keys selected from the regional key pools. For each node, we use 
this function with the generation, zone and node IDs in order to 
determine a unique random sequence for that node. More formally, 
for node A of zone z at generation j, the random index values of 
forward and backward key rings are determined as follows.  
ଶ݂ሺ݅݀஺ צ ݖ צ ݆ሻ ൌ ൫ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜ห ݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݇/2, 0 ൏ ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜ ൑ ܵ/2 ൯ [6] 
First, forward key ring of this node is determined by picking the 
forward keys with implicit sequence numbers of ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜ from the 
corresponding forward key pool ܨܭ ௭ܲ
௝. More formally, the forward 
key ring of node A of zone z at generation j, ܨܭܴ௜ௗಲ,௭
௝ , is defined as 
follows.  
ܨܭܴ௜ௗಲ,௭
௝ ൌ
ቄ݂݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝  ቚ ݂݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝ א ܨܭ ௭ܲ
௝  ר   ଵ݂ሺߟ, ߦ, ߜሻ ؠ ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜  , ݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,
௞
ଶ
ቅ   [7] 
The pseudorandom number sequence ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜  , ݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݇/2, is 
determined using Equation 6.  
Second, backward key ring is determined. The indexing 
mechanism for the backward key ring is also the same. Same ଶ݂ሺ. ሻ 
pseudorandom sequence (eq. 6) is used to determine the index of 
the backward keys in order to be able to match up the forward and 
backward keys in the pairwise key establishment phase. The only 
difference in backward key ring generation is that backward key 
ring of a node at generation j includes keys in key pools of 
generation ܩܹ ൅ ݆ െ 1, where GW is a system parameter called 
Generation Window. The main reason behind using generation 
window concept is to limit the amount of generations that a 
particular key becomes useful in order to provide self-healing. The 
use of generation window concept in Zo-RoK is borrowed from 
RoK scheme and will be explained in the next subsection. More 
formally, the backward key ring of node A of zone z at generation 
j, ܤܭܴ௜ௗಲ,௭
௝ , is defined as follows.  
ܤܭܴ௜ௗಲ,௭
௝ ൌ
ቊܾ݇ఎ,క,ఋ
ீௐା௝ିଵ  ቤ  
ܾ݇ఎ,క,ఋ
ீௐା௝ିଵ א ܤܭ ௭ܲ
ீௐା௝ିଵ  ר   ଵ݂ሺߟ, ߦ, ߜሻ ؠ ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜
݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݇/2
ቋ  [8] 
The pseudorandom number sequence ݎ௜ௗಲ,௭,௝,௜   , ݅ ൌ 1, 2, … , ݇/2, is 
determined using Equation 6, as in forward key ring. In other 
words, the sequence numbers, and consequently the subscript 
triplets, of the forward keys are the same the ones of the backward 
keys. For example, if forward key ring contains ݂݇ସ,଻,ଶଶ
௝ , then 
backward key ring also contains ܾ݇ସ,଻,ଶଶ
ீௐା௝ିଵ. 
Both forward and backward key rings are stored in the memory of 
a sensor node before the deployment. Therefore, total of  ௞
ଶ
൅ ௞
ଶ
ൌ ݇ 
keys are stored in each sensor node.  
2.4 Zone-based Deployment and Pairwise Key 
Generation in Zo-RoK 
Zone-based grouping of nodes and key ring assignments have been 
performed in the previous stage. Next step is the deployment of the 
nodes over the sensor field. In our zone-based deployment model, 
the sensor field is divided into ݐ ൈ ݐ zones. There is a group of 
nodes associated with each zone. Initially, generation-0 nodes 
selected from each group are deployed over the corresponding 
zones. As the nodes die, replacement nodes of future generations 
are continually deployed.  In order to have a fair comparison with 
the RoK scheme [3], the intra-zone deployment model in Zo-RoK 
scheme is assumed to be similar to the deployment model of RoK. 
In this deployment model, the deployment points in the zones are 
arranged as a regular grid in which only the horizontal and vertical 
neighbors hear each other. However, in order to accommodate the 
deployment errors in Zo-RoK, a certain fraction of nodes are 
assumed to be displaced to neighboring zones.   
After the deployment, two neighboring nodes try to establish a 
common pairwise key. The basic method of pairwise key 
generation is the same as the RoK scheme [3]; forward and 
backward keys are used together.  Two neighboring nodes, ܣ and 
ܤ, of generations ݆ଵ and ݆ଶ, ଵ݆ ൑ ݆ଶ, first check whether their 
generations overlap or not. According to [3], two nodes have 
overlapping generations if |݆ଵ െ ݆ଶ| ൏ ܩܹ. If their generations 
overlap, then they exchange all the ݇/2 forward/backward key 
subscript triplets in their key rings. In order to establish a common 
key, they have to have at least one common triplet in their key 
rings. Suppose such a triplet ሺߟ, ߦ, ߜሻ exists. The common key 
between these two nodes is calculated as the hash of forward key 
of generation ݆ଶ,  ݂݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝మ   and backward key of generation  
݆ଵ ൅ ܩܹ െ 1, ܾ݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝భାீௐିଵ. More formally, the common key, ܭ, is 
denoted as follows. 
ܭ ൌ ܪሺ݂݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝మ   צ   ܾ݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝భାீௐିଵሻ                                                    [9] 
In order both ܣ and ܤ calculate the same pairwise key, ݂݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝మ  and 
ܾ݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝భାீௐିଵ must be known by both users. Node ܤ has ݂݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝మ  in its 
forward key ring, but node ܣ does not. However, ܣ can calculate it 
by hashing the forward key ݂݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝భ  that it has in its forward key 
ring | ଵ݆ െ ݆ଶ| times. Similarly, ܾ݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝భାீௐିଵ exists in the backward 
key ring of node ܣ, but not of node ܤ. However, ܤ can calculate it 
by hashing the backward key ܾ݇ఎ,క,ఋ
௝మାீௐିଵ that it has in its backward 
key ring |݆ଵ െ ݆ଶ| times. 
If there is more than one common subscript triplet, then all of them 
are utilized in pairwise key generation in the same manner.   
The use of generation window, forward and backward keys 
provide the established keys to be useful for a limited amount of 
generations. In this way, if these keys are compromised, the 
attacker can make use of it only a few generations. This causes the 
system to self-heal in time. Since this self-healing behavior is 
mainly due to the RoK scheme [3], we do not go into its detail in 
this paper. The readers may refer to [3] for more details.  
3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We perform simulative performance evaluation and compare the 
performance of RoK scheme [3] with the proposed Zo-RoK 
scheme. The simulation software is developed using C# in .NET 
2005. Simulations are run on a computer with Intel® Celeron® M 
520 processor operating at 1.6 GHz. For the sake of accuracy, each 
simulation is repeated 20 times and the average values are 
reported. In order to make sure about the correctness of the 
simulation software, we reproduce the results in [3] with no error.  
The parameters that we used in our simulations are as follows. The 
deployment area is divided into 10 ൈ 10 ൌ 100 zones, i.e. 
Z ൌ 100. Each zone has 100 nodes, therefore, total number of 
nodes is 10000. As discussed in Section 2.4, intra-area deployment 
model is a grid-based one and only neighbors hear each other. 
Since we fixed the neighboring relationships, the communication 
range and deployment area are not system parameters. In order to 
accommodate deployment errors, 20% of nodes are deployed in 
neighboring zones using a uniform random distribution. As in RoK 
[3], at the end of each generation, dead nodes are replaced by new 
nodes with fresh key rings. The lifetime determination is also the 
same as RoK such that the lifetime of a node is determined 
according to a Gaussian distribution with mean ܩܹ/2 and 
standard deviation ܩܹ/6. The generation window, ܩܹ, is taken 
as 10.  
The global key pool size, ܲ, of both RoK and Zo-RoK is taken as 
20000; half of it is used for forward keys, half of it is for backward 
keys. In parallel to the work of Du et al. [2], horizontal/vertical key 
sharing constant, ݊, and diagonal key sharing constant, ݀, are taken 
as 0.15 and 0.10 respectively. These are the optimum values. Using 
these parameters, the sizes of regional forward/backward key 
pools, ܵ/2, is calculated using Equation 1 as ~178. 
We, first analyze secure connectivity metric, which is defined as 
the probability of two neighboring nodes being able to establish a 
pairwise key (i.e. having at least one common key index in their 
forward and backward key rings). With this analysis, we determine 
the key ring size necessary to have almost 1.0 secure connectivity 
for both RoK and Zo-RoK schemes. The results are depicted in 
Figure 2. Our results show that with 250 keys in forward and 250 
keys in backward key rings, RoK achieves perfect secure 
connectivity (i.e. 1.0) in all generations. Comparable secure 
connectivity for Zo-RoK is achieved when the forward and 
backward key ring sizes are 75 each. As a result, we can say that 
Zo-RoK uses 70% less memory as compared to RoK, while 
reaching the same level of secure connectivity. The main reason 
behind this performance improvement in Zo-RoK lies in the zone-
based deployment and key predistribution schemes. In Zo-RoK, 
the nodes that will be close to each other after deployment share 
keys, distant nodes do not. However, in RoK, distant nodes also 
share keys. Therefore, an increased key ring size is needed in RoK 
to achieve full secure connectivity as compared to proposed Zo-
RoK scheme.  
 
Figure 2.  Secure connectivity of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes. Both 
are constantly 1.0. 
Next, we analyze the resiliency of the network under node capture 
attacks. Here two different metrics are used. These metrics are the 
same ones used in RoK [3]: 
− Active compromise ratio: This is the ratio of active 
compromised links / all active links. As the attacker captures 
nodes, it learns keys that are also used to secure links in other 
part of the network. This metric is the ratio of amount of such 
extra active links compromised over the amount of all active 
links in the network. An active link is defined as a link 
currently used by alive nodes.  
− Total compromise ratio: This is the ratio of total compromised 
links / all links. In this metric, not only active links, but also 
dead links are taken into consideration (for both numerator and 
denominator). A dead link is defined as a link with one or two 
dead endpoints.  
Moreover, two attacker models are considered, again in parallel to 
the models in RoK [3]. These are temporary and constant attacker 
models. In temporary attacker model, the attacker starts its node 
capture attack at the beginning of generation 0 and gives up at the 
beginning of generation 10. Within this 10 generation interval, the 
attacker captures nodes at each round (round is a time unit and one 
generation has 10 rounds). In the constant attacker model, the 
attacker starts its attack by capturing nodes at the beginning of 
generation 0 and never gives up. 
Another attack parameter is the node capture rate of the attacker. 
This parameter is defined as the number of nodes that the attacker 
captures at each round. In our simulations, we consider 3 and 5 
node captures/round (i.e. 30 and 50 nodes per generation).  
Figures 3 – 6 show the resiliency performance of temporary 
attacker model. As shown in these figures, general trend in 
resiliency behavior of both schemes is similar but the harm caused 
by temporary attacker in Zo-RoK is significantly smaller than 
RoK. When the attack is at its highest stage around generation 10, 
RoK compromises as much as 6-fold more links as compared to 
proposed Zo-RoK scheme. This certainly makes Zo-RoK more 
resilient than RoK.  When Figures 3 and 5 are compared to Figures 
4 and 6 respectively, we see that compromise ratio increases as 
node capture rate increases, as expected. Moreover, these figures 
also show that the relative benefit of Zo-RoK as compared to RoK 
is higher with smaller node capture rates in the temporary attacker 
model. Figures 5 and 6 also show that the system self-heals almost 
at the same time (around generation 15). However, the overall 
effect of the attack in Zo-RoK is much smaller than RoK as 
discussed above. The main reason of this improved resiliency 
behavior of Zo-RoK is having less key in the key rings as 
compared to RoK. As discussed at the beginning of this section, 
perfect secure connectivity in Zo-RoK is achieved using 150 keys 
in the key ring; however, 500 keys are needed for RoK. Therefore, 
when a node is captured, the attacker obtains more keys in RoK as 
compared to Zo-RoK.  This makes the attacker to compromise 
more links in RoK.  
 
 
Figure 3. Total compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes 
under temporary attacker model with 3 node captures per round  
 
 
 Figure 4. Total compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes 
under temporary attacker model with 5 node captures per round 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Active compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes 
under temporary attacker model with 3 node captures per round 
 
Figure 6. Active compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes 
under temporary attacker model with 5 node captures per round 
The results for the constant attacker model, in which the attacker 
captures nodes forever, are shown in Figures 7 – 10. In both 
compromise metrics and node capture rates, Zo-RoK shows better 
resiliency performance than RoK does. Although total compromise 
ratio increases as the attack continues in both schemes (Figures 7 
and 8), the performance of Zo-RoK is up to 6-fold better than RoK 
at the beginning of the attack. The marginal gain of Zo-RoK 
reduces as the attack grows in upcoming generations since the 
compromise ratio approaches to its maximum value of 1.0. From 
Figures 9 and 10, we see that RoK is able to keep the active 
compromise ratio within [0.2 – 0.3] for 3 nodes/round capture rate, 
and within [0.4 – 0.6] for 5 nodes/round capture rate. On the other 
hand, as seen in Figures 9 and 10, the proposed Zo-RoK scheme 
keeps the active compromise ratio under control around 0.05 and 
0.1 for 3 and 5 nodes/round capture rates respectively. This 
analysis shows that the amount of active links compromised in 
RoK scheme becomes as much as 5-fold more as compared to  
Zo-RoK scheme. 
 
 
Figure 7. Total compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes 
under constant attacker model with 3 node captures per round 
 
Figure 8. Total compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes 
under constant attacker model with 5 node captures per round 
 
Figure 9. Active compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK schemes 
under constant attacker model with 3 node captures per round 
 
Figure 10. Active compromise ratios of RoK and Zo-RoK 
schemes under constant attacker model with 5 node captures per 
round 
 
4. RELATED WORK 
The basic model of random key predistribution in sensor networks 
is first proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [4]. This model 
inspired several other authors. Upcoming studies, such as [5], [6] 
and [7], mostly focused on increasing the security and performance 
of random key predistribution schemes either by using the help of 
the network or other cryptographic techniques. 
The use deployment knowledge to improve the performance of 
random key predistribution schemes is first proposed by Du et al. 
[2]. In this scheme, the sensor field is divided into zones and nodes 
are grouped according to these prior zone information. In this way, 
after deployment, the nodes that are physically closer to each other 
would have more chance to share keys. This, in turn, causes less 
memory usage for keys and better connectivity and resiliency 
performance. After [2], some other schemes, such as [8] and [9], 
that use prior location information are proposed.  
Ramkumar and Memon [12] proposed to use repeated hashing for 
increased efficiency in random key predistribution. Castelluccia 
and Spognardi proposed RoK scheme [3] for multiphase sensor 
networks. In this scheme, new nodes with fresh key rings replace 
dead ones. In this way, the network heals itself in time. Later, 
Yilmaz et al. [10] proposed two schemes for faster self healing.  
The proposed Zo-RoK scheme also aims self healing, but by 
keeping the harm caused by the attacker under certain limits. Zo-
RoK combines the best parts of Du et al. [2] and RoK [3] schemes 
and improves the resiliency of RoK up to 6-fold by using 70% less 
key memory for full secure connectivity.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We proposed a random key predistribution scheme for multiphase 
sensor networks. The proposed scheme, called Zo-RoK (Zone-
based Robust Key Distribution), uses prior deployment knowledge 
in order to reduce the key ring size requirements. In this way, the 
resiliency of the network against node capture attacks also 
increases. Due to the multiphase property of the network, dead 
nodes are replaced by new nodes. The new nodes come with fresh 
keys in their key rings. In this way, the attacker can make use of 
the compromised keys only for a small period of time and, 
therefore, the network heals itself.  
In Zo-RoK, we are inspired by [2] and [3] and combined the best 
parts of these schemes. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed 
Zo-RoK scheme is the first location-aware random key 
predistribution scheme proposed for multiphase sensor networks.  
We performed simulations for comparative performance 
evaluation. We compared the performance of RoK with Zo-RoK 
schemes. We have concluded that almost 100% key sharing 
probability can be achieved using 70% less keys in Zo-RoK. This 
reduced key amount also affects the resiliency of the system since 
a captured node would reveal fewer keys to the adversary. In this 
way, the active resiliency of the system is kept within reasonable 
limits. Even in the worst case scenario that we tested (attacker is 
attacking constantly with 5 nodes/round capture rate), only 10% of 
the active links are compromised in Zo-RoK, whereas in RoK, the 
attacker could compromise half of the network.  
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